Gender issues in the workplace are currently a hot topic.
First, we had the furore about male and female pay at the BBC. Next, the notorious memo from a Google employee which alleged that women are less biologically suited to be software engineers than men.
A paper in the latest American Economic Review (AER) provides an intriguing perspective on the issue.
Tim Besley of the LSE and two Swedish colleagues carried out a very detailed empirical analysis of elections in Sweden over a 20 year period. The title effectively summarises their work: Gender Quotas and the Crisis of the Mediocre Man.
To publish in the AER you have to have a theoretical model. This might have been developed with Jeremy Corbyn and his shadow cabinet team in mind. To quote the authors “the model predicts that less competent leaders pick less competent followers”. A leader who promised he would deal with outstanding student debt without realising this would cost £100bn feels at home with colleagues who are, if anything, even less numerate.
Competence is measured in a neat way from detailed micro data on factors such as an individual’s occupation, education, location, and so on, across the wider population. It is strongly correlated with the cognitive scores and leadership qualities assessed in the Swedish military draft.
In 1993, the Social Democratic Party introduced a gender quota for their candidates, who are elected on a list system. Men and women had to alternate on the list. Despite Sweden’s reputation of equality, in 1991 men were in first place on the list, and hence almost certain to be elected in 82 per cent of the elections. Such quotas are of course a sensitive issue, even within the British Labour Party in its more traditional areas.
Besley and his colleagues come to a conclusion which is as strong empirically as it is perhaps surprising. They find that the introduction of gender quotas drove out substantial numbers of mediocre male politicians. Not only that. In the areas where female representation was increased the most by the quota, the competence of the men who were elected also rose decisively.
The findings, they claim, have a relevance which goes beyond politics. For example, the chairman or chief executive usually have an important influence on the selection of board members. One of the motivations for incompetent leaders picking low quality candidates is that they feel less threatened by them. This creates a vicious circle of mediocrity.
The analysis also finds that the higher the competence of its leaders, the more likely a party was to win an election. Instead of trying to portray Corbyn as an extremist, perhaps the Tories should just point out that he is dim and useless. Of course, it is a leap of faith to go from a study of Swedish elections to FTSE boards or British election strategy. But the paper certainly gives food for thought.
It is yet another example of increased competition leading to an improvement in product quality, in this case the competence of politicians.
As published in City AM Wednesday 16th August 2017
Image: Jeremy Corbyn by Global Justice is licensed under CC by 2.0
The Premier League season opens on Friday against a background of stratospheric transfer deals, with Paris Saint Germain capturing the Barcelona striker Neymar for a world record €222m.
With the exception of Cristiano Ronaldo’s transfer from Manchester United to Real Madrid in 2009, all the top 10 most expensive player deals ever have taken place in the past four years.
No fewer than 33 of the top 100 of all time have happened in 2016 and 2017. Only one of the top 100 dates from the twentieth century: the €49.5m transfer of Christian Vieri from Lazio to Inter Milan, in 1999.
The stupendous flow of money into the game at the top level has created a self-reinforcing system. The rich clubs get richer. They can afford to buy the best players, which means they are even stronger on the field. And as a result, they attract even more money.
Yet this very process makes the competition more boring for spectators, in the sense that the outcomes at the end of the season become more predictable.
Arsenal have finished in the top five for each of the past 20 seasons. Manchester United have been in the top five – indeed the top three – in no fewer than 18 of these. Chelsea have occupied one of the top three places in 12 out the previous 14 seasons.
Manchester City were taken over by the Abu Dhabi United Group at the start of 2008/09, and in subsequent seasons have always been in the top five.
La Liga, the Spanish equivalent, has become dominated by just two clubs, Barcelona and Real Madrid. We have to go back to 2001/02 for a season in which one of them was not in the top two. In the past decade, they have won the league nine times between then, and also finished second nine times.
Money talks in sport. Celtic swept aside all opposition in the humbler setting of Scottish football last season, being unbeaten in all competitions. Their wage bill exceeded the total spent by the next six teams in the league combined.
But to put it into perspective, Celtic only paid out 80 per cent of the salaries at Burnley, which was easily the lowest spending team in last year’s Premier League.
Little wonder that Scottish teams struggle in European club football. Last season’s second and third, Aberdeen and Rangers, have already been eliminated in the 2017/18 preliminary rounds of the less glamorous competitions by teams from Cyprus and Luxembourg.
These massive inequalities seem to be characteristic of popular culture in the twenty-first century. Think of the current dominance in their respective spheres of Google, Facebook and Amazon.
We know that evolutionary forces are still at work in all of these markets. Myspace was the largest social networking site in the world until 2008, when it was overtaken, and then totally eclipsed, by Facebook.
It is always hard to imagine how the top incumbents can ever be displaced from their dominant position, but they inevitably are – eventually. Maybe Burnley and Bournemouth will be the teams of the 2030s.
As published in City AM Wednesday 9th August 2017
Last week we saw yet another major reversal of opinion by experts. For years we have all been lectured severely on the need to finish every single course of prescription drugs.
But the latest wisdom is that this is not necessary.
The announcement that petrol and diesel cars will be banned by 2040 only serves to remind the millions of diesel car owners that they were told only a few years ago that diesel was a Good Thing.
These stories have been very prominent in the media. But they are by no means isolated examples. Such reversals of opinion are all too common in the softer social and medical sciences. The “evidence base”, a phrase beloved of metropolitan liberal experts, is often built on sand.
This is neatly illustrated by psychology. Science is probably the most prestigious scientific journal in the world. At the end of 2015, a group of no fewer than 270 authors published a paper in it. They were all part of the teams which had published 100 scientific articles in top psychology journals.
In only 16 out of the 100 cases could the experimental results be replicated sufficiently closely to be confident that the original finding was valid.
The papers had been published in top psychology journals, and the original authors were involved in the replication experiment. So the replication rate should have been high.
Instead, it was so low that the lead author of the Science piece points out that they effectively knew nothing. The original finding could be correct, the different result in the attempted replication could be. Or neither of these could be true.
There is no suggestion at all that any sort of fraud or misrepresentation was involved when the original results were submitted for publication. But economic theory helps us understand how this absurd situation came about.
The great insight of economics is that people react to incentives.
Academics now face immense pressure to publish research papers. If they do not, they get more burdensome teaching loads, miss out on promotions, and might even get sacked. Their incentive is to publish.
Academic journals will only very rarely accept a paper which contains negative results. The whole culture is to find positive ones. So experiments will be re-designed, run with different samples, until that sought-after positive finding is obtained.
More and more academics are now desperate to publish more and more research papers. To meet this increase in demand, there has been a massive increase in the supply of journals willing to publish. Many of these are highly dubious, prepared to accept papers on payment of a fee by the authors.
For all except a small elite of individuals and institutions, academic life has become increasingly proletarianised. In the old Soviet Union, workers could get medals for exceeding the quota of, say, boot production. It did not matter if all the boots were left footed.
Many universities are now similar, with useless articles being churned out to meet the demands of bureaucrats. Time for a big purge, both of academics and their institutions.
As published in City AM Wednesday 2nd August 2017
Experts are finding it harder to be heard. But is that because of how they communicate? And how solid is their much-vaunted evidence base anyway?
Using evidence to assess the outcomes of policies is a vital part of good governance. Whether it is examining how a Budget will affect those on low incomes, or how well fishing quotas are managing stocks, no one but the most bumptious ideologue would deny it. The plastering of demonstrably dodgy statistics on the side of the Brexit battle bus last year stoked indignation on the part of many who think of themselves as rational and well-informed. The arrival of Donald Trump, an American president who feels no compunction about disseminating falsehood, has further darkened the mood among the liberal intelligentsia. There is a strong sense that the forces of reason must now rise up and see off the purveyors of the “post-truth” world.
We must, however, also grapple with one other contemporary reality. Underlying the great turmoil of politics at the moment is precisely the view that “the experts” are less trustworthy and objective than they purport to be. Rather, their considered opinions are seen as a self-reinforcing apparatus for putting themselves beyond challenge—to advance their holders’ status, their careers or, most damaging of all, their political views over those of the less-educated classes. The great popular suspicion is that an elite deploys its long years of schooling and “the evidence base” to make itself sound more knowledgeable as it rationalises the policies it was going to prefer all along.
Is that a fair charge? Well, that is an empirical question, and definitive evidence for answering it is in short supply. What we can usefully do, however, is interrogate where the “evidence base” comes from, and how solid it is.
“Agreeing to referee academic papers
yields neither monetary reward nor esteem,
but it subjects you to a range of human temptations”
Back in 2010 we wrote a piece arguing that an over-emphasis on empirical evidence in political rhetoric was alienating the public. The increasing reliance on the expert stamp of authority was eroding a sense of shared values between governors and the governed. Unless you were familiar with the latest nuance in academic evidence, we warned, you were automatically unqualified to have a valid opinion.
We thus see the current defenestration of experts as a reaction to long-term trends in public life. If it is true, as Michael Gove said during the European Union referendum debate, that people “have had enough of experts,” it is because empiricism locks non-experts out of discussions that impact on, but may not capture, their day-to-day experience. Last year, many members of the public formed an impression, whether fairly or not, of experts attempting to settle an important and emotive matter over their heads. A fault line between “the people” and those who think they know what’s good for them, which has been there for some time, became apparent. The June election was another reminder of this, as certain policies that many experts felt didn’t stack up—universal pensioner perks, free university education for students and costly nationalisations—turned out to be rather popular.
As paid-up members of the quantitative-expert class we share some of the current foreboding that a dystopian future awaits, where objective truth is not respected. There are many good examples of evidence influencing policy. But there are bad examples too, and if deference towards expert opinion goes too far, democracy ceases to operate as it should. Experts may see it as their role to uphold truth, facts and evidence, but they can only do so if they maintain public trust. That implies many things—better communication, for example. But before anything else it implies experts adopt a reflective approach to their own work, and open it up to outside scrutiny too.
There is a particular onus on social scientists here, because there is often more subjective judgment and interpretation in their fields than there is in measuring physical reality, leaving more scope for biases to entrench established views. Many social scientists are meticulous; but there are others who need to get their own house in order where “the evidence” is concerned. If it is going to be used to close down arguments it needs to be rock-solid, but how often is that the case?
Scarcely a day goes by without the press featuring some research, polished by a university PR team, purporting not only to establish that sausages cause cancer or that the people of Basingstoke are happier than the people of Burnley, but also that Something Must Be Done About It.
Academic papers from the social sciences and health are now an important foundation of what has come to be called the “evidence base.” Who could be against evidence? But this is a rather telling phrase. The “base,” when you stop and think about it, is logically superfluous; its function is purely rhetorical—suggesting that the evidence in question (unlike any other) is rested on something that shores it up. But, as we shall see, there are often question marks around its solidity, especially in the social sciences.
The magic concept invoked to define it—and to separate the priesthood from the laity has become that of “peer review.” Peer review is the process by which submissions to academic journals are scrutinised by the academic peers of the authors—the “referees.” Only papers deemed suitable by referees will be published.
The process of this scrutiny, of peer review, may conjure up images of scholars carefully examining the article line by line, checking every single piece of analysis verifying its claims. Very occasionally, this Platonic ideal may exist. When, for example, Andrew Wiles claimed to have proved Fermat’s Last Theorem, his manuscript was subjected to the most thorough investigation imaginable by the world’s leading experts in the relevant areas of maths. An error was indeed discovered, one which Wiles was happily able to fix after months of wrestling with the problem. As a result of the peer review process in this case, we can be entirely confident that Wiles proved Fermat’s Last Theorem.
In almost all other cases, at least within the social sciences, the reality of peer review is rather different. We should think of a harassed academic, pressured by the need to do his or her own research, by the demands of both students and the university administrators and being pestered by the journal editors to submit the review.
Refereeing is both unpaid and anonymous. The referee receives neither monetary reward nor the esteem that comes with getting one’s name in print. The task is seen as a tedious chore, and procrastination is widespread. In the social sciences, there are frequently delays of a year, and more occasionally two, between submitting the manuscript and receiving the referee reports.
One might ask why academics agree to referee papers at all? In part, it is convention: it is simply part of the everyday life of being an academic. But once a year many journals will publish a list of the names of their referees. This incremental addition to your CV, just might—perhaps, eventually—be part of the package that lands you a promotion or a job at a better university.
But serving as a referee under these conditions subjects you to a range of human temptations. Does the paper support or undermine one’s own work, for example, or does it appear to be written by a rival? Does it cite enough of the papers of the reviewers and his or her friends, because the number of citations of your own work by other academics is an important metric by which you are judged? Here, at long last, is the chance to slap down, under the cloak of anonymity, the smartarse who slapped you down at that conference five years ago.
Then there is the question of who chooses the referee. Enter the editorial board, which is made up—once again—of academics typically paid little or nothing. Again, the human factor creeps in. Years ago, one of the present authors submitted a paper to a leading American economics journal, a critique of a published article that had gained a certain kudos. One of the authors of the criticised piece was an editor at that journal—and, as was discovered by chance a few years later, he gave it to his co-author to referee. Needless to say, the negative article wasn’t accepted.
Once a paper is published, the chances of it being subjected to further scrutiny are remote. A tiny handful of articles become famous, and are downloaded thousands of times. Many receive no attention, and most will be read by very few scholars. Yet the mere fact that a paper has gone through peer review confers on it an authority in debate, which the lay person cannot challenge. So, all too often, there is no post-publication challenge within the academy, and no licence for challenge from outside. Locked out by the experts, some laypeople may start to feel like they have had enough.
So how might we improve peer review, and build “the evidence” on a firmer foundation? Economics has rightly been subjected to many criticisms, especially since the financial crisis. But the discipline has one extremely powerful insight, perhaps the only general law in the whole of the social sciences: people react to incentives. They may not always do so with the complete rationality described in economics textbooks. But thinking through the rewards on offer in any given situation helps to understand why people behave as they do.
Ideally, the incentives around research should be structured so as to maximise constructive scrutiny of every claim that is made. Instead, the rising pressures on academics to publish has created a set of incentives that exacerbates the need to negotiate the peer review process and appear in academic journals. The rising demand to publish has been met by a large increase in the supply of academic journals. One recent estimate is that there were 35,000 peer-reviewed journals at the end of 2014, many of them of decidedly doubtful quality. Why? Because incentives are everywhere.
A paper in the 23rd March edition of Nature by a group of Polish academics mercilessly exposes the problem. The title neatly captures the content of the article: “Predatory journals recruit fake editor.” The authors begin in an uncompromising manner: “Thousands of academic journals do not aspire to quality. They exist primarily to extract fees from authors.” They go on: “These predatory journals follow lax or non-existent peer-review procedures… researchers eager to publish (lest they perish) may submit papers without verifying the journal’s reputability.”
They adopted the brilliant strategy of creating a profile for a fictitious academic Anna O Szust, and applied on her behalf to be an editor of 360 journals. Szust is the Polish word for “a fraud.” Her profile was “dismally inadequate for a role as editor,” yet 48 of the journals offered to make her one, often conditional on her recruiting paid submissions to the journals.
This new study follows on from a 2013 piece by the journalist John Bohannon in which his purposefully flawed article was accepted for publication by 157 of the 304 open-access journals to which it was submitted, contingent on payment of author fees. That was a warning sign, and things have got worse since. The Nature authors state that “the number of predatory journals has increased at an alarming rate. By 2015, more than half a million papers had been published in them.”
“Once a paper is published,
the chances of it being subjected
to further scrutiny are remote”
None of this means that academic journals have moved into a post-truth world. There are clearly journals where high standards apply. The Polish academics approached 120 journals on the respected Journal Citation Reports directory as part of the 360 in their experiment. None of them accepted “Mrs Fraud” as an editor. And one can imagine specific reforms to get rid of those sorts of journals that are profiting through the equivalent of vanity publishing.
Even in serious journals, however, and even where referees do try their best, the scrutiny of just one or two people provides scant security. The mere fact that a paper has been peer reviewed is no guarantee of its quality or, indeed, its reliability.
The problem is nicely illustrated by a paper that appeared in Science at the end of 2015, in which a team of no fewer than 270 authors and co-authors attempted to replicate the results of 100 other experiments that they had published in leading psychology journals. The involvement of the original authors should have made it easier to reproduce the results. Only 36 per cent of the attempted replications led to results that were sizeable enough that one could be confident they had not arisen by chance. In other words, almost two-thirds of the attempts to replicate published, peer-reviewed results of papers in the top psychology journals failed completely.
The veneration of peer review has simply gone too far. The connected concept of “evidence based” has permeated policy discourse, and is sometimes used to lock out non-experts. But in psychology at least, as we have seen, there are papers whose findings could not be replicated that could have been flourished as part of an evidence base in support of one policy stance or another. The evidence is not “based” on any firm foundations; it rests on sand.
So conventional review is flawed; but fortunately, there are alternatives—some of them already in use. One other test of academic papers is by their ability to make successful predictions. This is not infallible. Someone may strike lucky and carry out the scientific equivalent of successfully calling heads 10 times in a row. But consider, say, coronary heart disease. A tiny handful of the thousands of papers on the topic published each year may eventually lead to the development of drugs that successfully pass all the stringent tests set out by the authorities and be licensed for use. To get that far, their insights about what makes the condition better or worse has to be borne out in clinical testing in the case histories of real patients. They do real good, and we can be confident they have some validity.
“Experts need to show some humility:
they can’t diagnose and prescribe
for all of society’s ills”
Another recent alternative is to open up the peer review process, so that it actively invites challenge, by letting scientific merit be determined by the esteem of the peer group as a whole, not just by two or three selected referees. One example is the physics e-print archive arXiv.org (pronounced “archive”). Authors can post their papers here prior to publication in a journal if they like, though some feel no need. The site has grown to embrace not just physics but maths and computer science, and, in a small way, quantitative finance.
To post a paper, an author must merely be endorsed by someone who has already published on arXiv. Moderators refuse papers which are obviously not science at all. But scientific importance emerges from the process of downloading and citation. So peer review really is carried out collectively by the relevant scientific community. The more downloads and citations, the chances of an error going undetected become very low indeed. The context is different, of course, but there is an echo here of the logic with which Google has conquered the world.
It is, however, only in the harder sciences where there has been a serious embrace of something approaching the marketplace—of the consumers, other academics in the field, deciding on the worth of a paper. In most disciplines the only model remains a monopoly supplier—the prestigious journal and its editorial board.
But it is in the social sciences that the suppression of challenge can have most political effect. A paper may be brandished purporting to show that all family structures are of equal merit, or that mass immigration does not reduce real wages, perhaps conflicting with religious convictions, personal experience or vernacular conceptions of how society functions. Whatever one’s views, the impression created that expert findings on such contentious political issues are immutable fact is bound to breed cynicism and “expert fatigue.”
An over-emphasis on expert opinion has already had insidious effects on democracy. One of these is a view among some in the intelligentsia, as described in Tom Clark’s Prospect piece (“Voting Out,” February), that the fundamental purpose of democracy is optimal, rational decision-making; if the electorate cannot manage this they—and by implication the democratic system—are at fault.
There are two obvious problems with this. Firstly, in order to rationally optimise society, someone would need to decide what the objectives are. And that is clearly a matter of political opinion. Secondly, it is flagrant mission creep. Democracy is, first and foremost, a mechanism for managing disagreement in society without bloodshed, chaos or repression. To boot, it allows the people to peacefully throw out those in power if they’re doing a bad job.
Expert analysis is of limited use in these tasks. Its recommendations cannot capture what the polymath Michael Polanyi called “tacit knowledge”—knowledge that is based on experience, which shapes people’s habits and beliefs without being codified. This doesn’t get a look-in.
Indeed, in modern social science it is very often only that which gets counted that is deemed to count. And who decides on that? It is, overwhelmingly, the “experts” who get to write the surveys that feed so much social science its raw material. If, for example, they are more interested in what someone’s ethnicity does to their views than they are in whether the respondent lives in the countryside rather than the city, then that is what scarce slots in the questionnaire will be used to find out. Through such means, priors and prejudices about what merits counting can colour the data, even before it has been crunched.
Democracy is a very crude system for giving decision-makers feedback about the quality of our lives. But this most basic process of consultation can never be replaced by data. For quantitative metrics are often very “lossy”—some things are not counted, and thus cease to count. Where experts imagine they can settle a fundamentally political argument through such empirical evidence, the consequences can fast become absurd.
In the UK, the Office for National Statistics has, encouraged by David Cameron in his early tieless phase, measured “well-being” and “happiness,” to guide public policy. This sort of data conflates a very great number of causal factors, which dilutes its value in guiding public policy decisions. And yet one commentator even suggested that, because well-being data showed high levels of contentment in Britain, the vote for Brexit need not have happened.
More generally, the result of putting empirical analysis on a pedestal can be intolerance towards others who start with different views. That was in evidence in some of last year’s sneering at “Leave” voters as dupes who couldn’t understand the arguments. Furthermore, if evidence is everything, but many don’t have the training to process it properly, then unscrupulous characters will spot a chance to make up the odd little, self-serving “fact” of their own—after all, only a minority will know the difference. The rise of empiricism in a world where we are bombarded with information might thus have actually contributed to the post-truth phenomenon.
Why did experts become so prominent in the decades before the crash? The narrowing of disagreement in politics after the end of the Cold War was surely important, as was the associated rise in managerialism. For example, central banks, which make hugely political decisions that shape the relative fortunes of borrowers and savers, were suddenly held to be above politics, and given independence. Huge faith was vested in their predictions, and those of associated technocrats at institutions like the International Monetary Fund, until the crash showed these could not be always depended on.
In the more austere times that have followed, the fundamental conflicts over resources and priorities—between natives and foreigners, between social classes—that probably never truly went away, are now back with a vengeance. The experts certainly have misgivings about all forms of populism and especially about Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party, with its cavalier assumptions about how much revenue it could easily raise.
But the backlash against “experts” is, nonetheless, still principally associated with the right. The more educated, liberal-leaning section of society needs to understand why this is. It is not because, as is commonly assumed, the right is simply the political wing of the dark side.
The right’s great insight is that the left can create a political apparatus with good intentions but the wrong incentives, and that this apparatus can become impervious to challenge. It argues that political choice is based on economic self-interest, and that this can apply, perhaps unconsciously, even to people apparently motivated by the public interest. These suspicions, articulated as “public choice theory” by the Nobel Prize winner James Buchanan, have most often been applied to bureaucracies with noble theoretical aims that go awry in practice, but the same analysis can be extended to universities and research institutes too—or indeed “the evidence base.” The Buchanan analysis can easily morph into an intransigent view that pursuing practically any collective goal will lead to empire-building bureaucracies, which also fall prey to “capture” by self-serving lobbyists. Taken to extremes, it promotes a profoundly destructive, atomistic worldview that leaves society paralysed in the face of the most serious moral questions. One only has to look across the Atlantic at the way the American right is responding to climate change and healthcare to see that.
Those who reasonably resist this worldview can counter it in two ways: either through bitter “with us or against us” polarisation, or by having the foresight to avoid the charges that public choice theory would lay at the academy’s door in the first place. That means at least examining the possibility that policies that come blessed with an expert stamp are serving the interests of those who put them forward, rather than dismissing it out of hand.
Truth and evidence must obviously be upheld. But there is a real danger in expert elites studying the electorate at arm’s length and seeking a kind of proxy influence without having to worry about gaining political support. We must not denigrate evidence-based thinking, a bad habit of thuggish regimes, but we must subject it to more “sense-checking,” and in communicating it must pause and give thought to what the broader public will make of it. The alternative is a dialogue of the deaf between the know-all minority and a general populace which some may caricature as know-nothings. In such a stand-off, real evidence soon becomes devoid of all currency.
To avert it, the experts need to show some humility: we can’t diagnose and prescribe for all of society’s ills. We also need to recognise that to be persuasive we must actually persuade—and not simply hector. The great mass of voters are not, after all, under any obligation to accept expert authority. We need to reflect critically on the problems in academia that can block the testing of ideas on the inside, and dismiss all challenge from outside our walls. And we need to show self-awareness: deep intimacy with a subject can, on occasion, lapse into a tunnel vision that blanks out culturally-rooted perceptions and the lived experience of voters. Those things can’t be ignored. They are, after all, the lifeblood and raison d’être of politics, and can only be gauged by asking people, unschooled as well as schooled, for their opinions, and ultimately relying on their decisions.
As published in August 2017 edition of Prospect Magazine
by Helen Jackson and Paul Ormerod
Image: Michael Gove by Policy Exchange is licensed under CC by 2.0
Following the disclosure of salaries at the BBC, it has hardly seemed possible to open a newspaper or switch on the television without being bombarded by stories about pay.
By pure coincidence, an academic paper entitled “Pay for Performance and Beyond” has just appeared. So what, you might ask? Except that it is one of the 2016 Nobel Prize lectures, by Bengt Holmstrom, a professor at MIT.
Holmstrom’s work began in the 1970s on the so-called principal-agent problem. This is of great practical importance. For example, how should the owners of companies (the “principals”, in economic jargon) design contracts so that the interests of the directors (the “agents”) are aligned as closely as possible with the interests of the shareholders?
Many aspects of economics have a lot of influence on policy making. But this is not yet one of them. We have only to think of the behaviour of many bankers in the run up to the financial crisis. Stupendous bonuses were paid out to the employees, and, in examples such as Lehman Brothers, the owners lost almost everything.
It is not just at the top levels that scandals occur. Towards the end of last year, Wells Fargo had to pay $185m in penalties. Holmstrom cites this prominently in his lecture. The performance of branch managers was monitored daily. They discovered that one way of doing well was to open shell accounts for existing customers. These were accounts which the customers themselves did not know about, but they counted towards the managers’ bonuses.
A culture of pressure to perform against measured criteria can lead to problems even when the organisations involved are not strongly driven by money.
The education system in the UK has many examples. But the one given by Holmstrom is even more dramatic. The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 in the US was very well intentioned. But the test-based incentives eventually led, around a decade later, to teachers in Atlanta being convicted of racketeering and serving jail sentences for fixing exam results.
Holmstrom is in many ways a very conventional economist – his Nobel lecture rapidly becomes full of dense mathematics. He believes that, given the right information and incentives, people will make rational decisions.
This is why his conclusion is so startling.
He writes: “one of the main lessons from working on incentive problems for 25 years is that, within firms, high-powered financial incentives can be very dysfunctional and attempts to bring the market inside the firm are generally misguided”.
The whole trend in recent years has been to bring even more market-type systems inside companies, from bonuses for meeting potentially counter-productive targets, to devolving budget authority away from the discretion of mangers and handing it to specialised departments.
Holmstrom’s conclusion implies the need for a pretty radical rethink of the way incentives are structured, in both the public and private sectors.
The dominant economic narrative in the UK is a pretty gloomy one just now.
True, employment is at a record high. But, counter the whingers and whiners, zero hours contracts and low pay proliferate.
The political discourse is full of the struggles of the JAMs – the Just About Managing The public sector moans about its pay. During the election, Labour played ruthlessly on the fears and anxieties of the elderly about inheritance and the value of pensions.
All in all, the picture seems bleak. But a much more positive vision is given by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) in its measure of well-being.
The Measuring National Well-being (MNW) programme was established in November 2010 under David Cameron. It is not without its critics. But if we take it at face value, compared to a year ago the country is definitely happier.
As the ONS puts it: “the latest update provides a broadly positive picture of life in the UK, with the majority of indicators either improving or staying the same over the one year period”.
There seems to be a bit of a glitch. The ONS boasts of using no fewer than 43 separate indicators to measure well-being. But they go on to state, in the very same sentence, that of these 43 measures, “15 improved, 18 stayed the same and two deteriorated, compared with one year earlier”. Perhaps the relevant statistician here received his or her basic training at the Diane Abbott School of Arithmetic.
No matter, it could be that some of the series have simply not been updated at all. Certainly, many people might not be too concerned to learn that “on environmental sustainability, the proportion of waste from households that was recycled fell over a one-year period, while remaining unchanged over the three-year period”.
But compared to a year previously, on some key indicators, as a nation we were more satisfied with our jobs, felt our health was better, and enjoyed our leisure time more.
This does not fit readily with political discussion recently in the mainstream media.
One possible reason is that many of the ONS measures rely on conventional survey techniques. These can take some time to carry out. So the ONS only release new data every six months, and the latest one was in April. The indicators could just be out of date.
However, a very similar story is told by a real-time analysis of Twitter data, which I have been carrying out with my UCL colleague Rickard Nyman since June 2016 (admittedly just for the London area).
We use advanced machine learning algorithms which essentially measure the sentiment level of a tweet as a whole, rather than relying on the now obsolete approach of looking for specific positive and negative words.
Sentiment in London started to rise quite sharply last autumn, dipped down slightly in April and May, but is now back up again.
Many conventional economic statistics are not really designed for the modern economy. So, despite, all its faults, the ONS well-being measure may be a step in the right direction, and regardless of what the media tells you, Britain may indeed be getting happier.
As published in City AM Wednesday 19th July 2017
The slow recovery since the financial crisis remains a dominant issue in both political and economic debate.
The economy has definitely revived since 2009, the depth of the recession, in both Britain and America. The average annual growth in real GDP has been very similar, at 2.0 and 2.1 per cent respectively. This is much better than in the Mediterranean economies, where growth over the 2009-2016 period is still negative. Even so, the Anglo-Saxon countries have not expanded as rapidly as they have done in previous recoveries.
A key reason for this is the lack of vision being shown by the corporate sector. True, highly innovative companies like Facebook have emerged over the past decade, and start ups continue to proliferate.
But the longer standing major firms in both the UK and the US have become real stick in the muds. Caution, safety first and an increasingly stultifying bureaucracy envelop them.
The contrast in the behaviour of the corporate sector in the two major financial crises of the 1930s and late 2000s makes this clear. The US national accounts only have data going back to 1929, the year before the Great Recession. But in that year, the net savings of non-financial companies was 3.5 per cent of GDP.
When the recession struck, firms ran down their accumulated cash. Between 1930 and 1934, their net savings were negative, averaging -2.4 per cent of GDP. That amounts to a shift during the recession from a surplus of $650 billion in 1929 to an annual overspend of $450 billion in today’s prices.
In the United States, during the decade prior to the crash, 1998-2007, companies on average had net savings of 2.6 per cent of GDP each year. Since 2009, this has averaged 4.0 per cent. So instead of spending their assets, as they did in the 1930s, companies this time round have simply saved more.
To be fair, American firms are gradually moving back towards their savings patterns prior to the crisis. From 5.4 per cent of GDP in 2010, net savings in 2016 were back down to 3.1 per cent. They are gradually getting their confidence back, their “animal spirits” as Keynes called it.
There are signs of this happening in Britain as well. Between 1998 and 2007, net savings by non-financial companies averaged 1.3 per cent of GDP. From the trough of the recession to now, the annual average has been 2.7 per cent. As in the US, the figure has come down from 2009-2011, when it averaged 3.8 per cent. But firms remain cautious.
But in both the UK and the US, companies are sitting on piles of cash and lack the entrepreneurial spirit to spend it. Boards obsess about fashionable concepts such as lean and agile processes and management. At the same time they set up procurement systems more suited to the old Soviet Union in terms of the tick box mentality which prevails.
Capitalism must be seen to be delivering the goods, and many of our major companies are simply not doing this.
As published in City AM Wednesday 12th July 2017
Image: London Construction by Bonny Jodwin is licensed under CC by 2.0
The income tax system in the UK is highly progressive.
Not many people know that, to use a catch phrase attributed, rightly or wrongly, to the great actor Michael Caine.
The top one per cent of earners contribute 27 per cent of all income tax receipts. To put it in context, just 300,000 people pay nearly three times as much in total as the bottom 15m taxpayers. Despite all the political rhetoric about tax avoidance, high earners cough up a very large amount of money to the Exchequer every year.
Under the Labour government of the 1970s, the highest marginal tax rate was no less than 98 per cent. But the top one per cent of earners paid only 11 per cent of all income tax.
Jeremy Corbyn and shadow chancellor John McDonnell pledged in their manifesto to raise around another £15bn a year in tax from this group. In addition, corporation tax on profits would allegedly raise a further £19bn.
The realism of Labour’s costings as a whole was called into serious question at the time by people such as Paul Johnson at the Institute for Fiscal Studies.
A paper published in the latest American Economic Review produces strong evidence that it is purely wishful thinking to imagine that anything like these amounts could be raised. In the modern world, both skilled labour and capital are highly mobile. There would simply be movement out of the UK altogether.
The authors, Enrico Moretti and Daniel Wilson of Berkley and the San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank, carry out a very detailed statistical analysis of the impact of the different state income tax rates in the US on where highly skilled people choose to work.
Personal taxes vary enormously across the American states. In California, for example, the average tax rate arising on top earners which is due solely to state rather than federal taxation is eight per cent. In contrast, in Texas (and eight other states) it is zero. Over the period of the study – 1977 to 2010 – rates have also varied substantially within individual states.
Moretti and Wilson compile an impressively detailed set of data on individuals they describe as ‘star scientists’, defined as those scientists who are very prolific in generating patents. They examine the location decisions of some 260,000 individuals during the period they analyse.
Their conclusion is unequivocal: “we uncover large, stable, and precisely estimated effects of personal and corporate taxes on star scientists’ migration patterns”. Essentially, steep taxes drove away high-achievers.
Tax rates are important not just to individuals in choosing where they want to work. The different corporate tax rates levied by individual states affect where companies such as Microsoft and General Electric locate their most productive and innovative researchers.
There are of course many factors which determine where people and firms decide to locate. But the idea that innovative people will simply sit around en masse and wait to be fleeced is pure fantasy. There may be little chance of the current Labour leadership understanding the real world, but the electorate needs to.
As published in City AM Wednesday 5th July 2017
Image: Jeremy Corbyn and John McDonnell by Rwendland is licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0
Perhaps George Osborne’s most abiding legacy from his time as chancellor will be the creation of the concept of the Northern Powerhouse. Certainly Manchester, its principal focus, is booming.
The landscape of the centre is being altered dramatically by skyscrapers. Peel Holdings, the huge investment and property outfit, is planning to double the size of the development around Media City in the old docks, where the BBC was relocated. The airport, already the third busiest in the UK, is expanding.
All in all, it seems a triumph for modern capitalism. After decades of relative decline, a city is being transformed by private enterprise. But what is really going on?
In a piece this month in the MIT publication Technology Review, urban guru Richard Florida has picked up on a startling new trend in the location of new technology companies in the US.
In the 1980s, there were essentially no high tech companies in city locations. Instead, we had Intel and Apple in Silicon Valley, Microsoft in the Seattle suburbs, the Route 128 beltway outside Boston, and the corporate campuses of North Carolina’s Research Triangle.
Now, urban centres are rapidly becoming the places which attract technology companies. In 2016, the San Francisco metro area was top of the list for venture capital investment, attracting more than three times the amount of the iconic location of Silicon Valley. Google has taken over the old Port Authority building in Manhattan. Amazon’s headquarters are in downtown Seattle.
The impact of this new, high concentration of tech firms is to intensify geographic inequalities. As Florida puts it: “tech startups helped turn a handful of metro areas into megastars. Now, they’re tearing those cities apart.”
A relatively small number of urban areas in America, and within them a small number of neighbourhoods, are capturing all the benefits.
The same sort of thing seems to be going on in Greater Manchester. A few areas are soaring away and attracting wealth and talent. In 1981, fewer than 600 people lived in what the Council describes as “the heart of Manchester”. Now, over 50,000 do, almost all of them young graduates.
But the more traditional outlying boroughs of the city region, especially to the north and east, are struggling to capture any trickle down from this massive transformation. Indeed, they are at risk of losing out, as their young bright sparks are attracted by the life of the inner metropolis.
Richard Florida does not just identify the problem, he suggests some possible solutions. One of which is a programme of building lots of good housing in the outlying areas, supplemented by a top class public transport service. This would keep house prices down, and attract some of the people stuck in rabbit warrens in the urban centres.
Manchester already has a modern tram service. But the new Labour mayor, Andy Burnham, is resolutely opposed to building on the green belt just to the north and east of the city. Yet another example of the sanctimonious intentions of the Left serving to intensify, not reduce, inequality.
As published in City AM Thursday 29th June 2017
There is a great deal of discussion, following the election, of relaxing or even abandoning austerity.
There is an equal amount of confusion about this, because the same word is being used to describe two quite separate concepts.
The consequences of the government changing its policy on austerity are dramatically different, depending on which one it is.
One meaning of the word is what we might call “social austerity”. From any given pot of money available to a government, its supporters believe that, in general, tax cuts should be promoted rather than public spending increased. Opponents argue that public spending as a result has become underfunded. Local councils, education, and the NHS all need more money.
Social austerity can be relieved, as even the DUP and some Conservatives argue, by increasing spending appropriately, and funding it by increases in taxation. This was an important aspect of Labour’s manifesto, and the tragedy at Grenfell Tower has intensified the discussion around it.
The main risk is purely political. Are voters really and truly willing to pay more tax, rather than just wanting someone else to pay it?
There are some potential adverse economic consequences if the policy of higher taxation is pushed too far. Former French President Francois Hollande’s 75 per cent tax rate led to several hundred thousand skilled young people leaving France, mainly for the UK. If companies are taxed too heavily, they may choose to locate to another country. Both skilled labour and capital are geographically mobile.
But, within reason, social austerity could be relaxed without perhaps too many fears in this direction.
“Economic austerity” is quite a different matter. Opponents of this want to increase the gap between government spending and tax receipts – the so-called fiscal deficit. This is funded by issuing government bonds. So the deficit in any given year goes up, and the outstanding stock of government debt also rises.
Any relaxation of social austerity is paid for by higher taxes now. Any relaxation of economic austerity is paid for by borrowing more now.
But the debt has to be repaid at some point, and the interest payments on it must be met. So taxes in the future will be higher. Either way, less austerity means more tax.
John Maynard Keynes himself made it very clear that increasing public spending at a time of full employment would simply lead to more inflation. There are areas of the country where there probably are people registered as unemployed who genuinely do want to work – the Welsh Valleys, for example. But the rest of the UK is at full employment.
The number of people in employment is at an all-time high, at 32m. This has risen by 2.8m since 2010. Meanwhile the unemployment rate has fallen from 7.9 per cent in 2010 to just 4.6 per cent today.
Any major fiscal stimulus to the economy now would simply bid up wages, leading to higher costs and higher inflation.
The public mood on social austerity may have shifted. But the case for economic austerity is stronger than it has ever been.